What I Saw At Kuje Prison By Sadeeq Shehu (A Military & Security Expert)
On Kuje Prison Break, Sadeeq Shehu, a military and security expert, wrote:
WHAT I SAW KUJE PRISON
I visited the Kuje Prison for the first time yesterday to see for myself the scene of the attack and somehow put myself in the mind of the attackers in a kind of playback.
I
wanted to also see if I could identify some factors that might have
contributed to the seeming ease with which the attack was carried out
and assess how existing security measures in Kuje compare with what
should be the standard for a facility of similar standing.
ABOUT KUJE PRISON
a.
It is classified as a Medium Security (MS) prison meaning it is
supposed to hold inmates whose escape would pose just moderate risk to
community and/or inmates with moderate capacity to break jail.
(BH/ISWAP/Ansaru terrorist is high risk and should be in MS)
b. Kuje is designed to hold 560 inmates maximum but as at time of attack was holding some 1000 inmates ie less supervision
c. The
main access road leading to the main gate is covered by trees and
overgrown bushes such that one’s approach is effectively covered from
sight of sentries at gate even in daylight not to say night
d. The outer perimeter wall is just about 6-7ft high as against recommended height of 8-15 ft.
e. Only one or two coil of razor wire placed on top of perimeter wall against recommended 3 coils one on top the other.
f. No second inner fence line once you are over the first perimeter wall you’re through. Prison buildings should have outer and inner fence lines with a clear zone of at least 10 yards in between.
g. The
walls of the prison (which attackers broke) is of ordinary cement and
block instead of recommended 4 inch thick reinforced concrete wall or precast
h.
There are two observation towers but not high enough with line of sight
covered by trees and thick bushes. Additionally being positioned deep
inside building instead of by the outer perimeter wall the observation
towers cannot serve the intended purpose which is to be able..
..to sight /engage with fire, intruders far off before they even reach outer perimeter or raise alarm.
I. A few cctv cameras on the towers (dunno if working) but such cctv should have been on the outer approaches.
m.
I observed a few fixed stationery security lights around bt preferably
movable lights that are wired to motion sensors so that they come on
& point to area of intrusion. I confirm light was off during op
which could be normal power outage, deliberate action or no standby
power
n. On site Response force (according to NCS official who briefed press) is supposed to comprise 38 military,
some unspecified police and civil defense and armed correctional
service personnel but no clarity if these were on ground on particular
day. Conflicting testimonies
o. The absence of any wounded or
dead attacker left behind lends credence to the claim that all the armed
defenders ran away without returning effective fire.
p.
Facing outside from inside the prison, the left , right, and front are
all covered by thick grasses, bushes & a deep ravine valley to the
right from which 1 could approach prison completely unobserved
especially at night. The attackers came on foot via the valley to the
right
q. The fact that attackers operated for between 1-3
hours (depending on source) and again left on foot without the defenders
mounting a counterattack (after recovering from initial surprise),
the
fact that a divisional police station I sighted 2.5 km away couldn’t
provide reinforcements, means there was no any contingency plan in
place.
r. Mixing dangerous BHT inmates who ought to be in a
maximum security prison with detained less dangerous politicians (Nyame
Dariye Lawan Kyari) in same prison was against recommended practice for
prison security of categorization and allocation of inmates and...
...probably endangered the less dangerous politicians the attackers could have shot them just for the fun of it or abducted them
The comptroller in charge of that axis should fired immediately.
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